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A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR UNCOOPERATIVE
FEDERALISTS
Ernest A. Young*
Heather Gerken was not always a federalism scholar. In fact, for years she delight-
ed in mocking those of us who cared about limits on national power, insisting that the
states were good only for picking flags and birds.I Now, of course, Professor Gerken is
one of the brightest stars in the federalism field,2 and it is a pleasure to have this oppor-
tunity to honor and take stock of her important work in this area - with only a hint of "I
told you so."
Professor Gerken's interest in federalism is ironic not only because of her earlier
views on the subject, but also because proponents of federalism on the Left remain few
and far between. Although we saw a slight uptick in liberal interest in state autonomy
during the dark days (for them) of the George W. Bush administration, 3 much of this
scholarship was politically opportunistic and largely faded with the return of good liber-
als to national preeminence after 2008.4 By and large, the conventional wisdom in the
* Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School. This essay is part of a Tulsa Law Review symposium hon-
oring the work of Heather Gerken. I am grateful to the Law Review and the University of Tulsa College of Law
for the opportunity to participate, and to David Houska for timely research assistance. Obviously, this essay is
for Heather, my co-clerk and sister-in-all-but-birth.
1. States are not actually as good at picking birds as one might think. Seven different states claim the car-
dinal, and in fact, just five different birds (the cardinal, meadowlark, mockingbird, bluebird, and goldfinch)
account for twenty-six states. See Frank Jacobs, Federal Feathers, BIG THINK (Sept. 21, 2009, 4:46 AM),
http:/ibigthink.com/strange-maps/412-federal-feathers (providing a cool map, and commenting that "instead of
choosing birds unique to each state, or at least not shared with other states, these insignia show an intriguing
degree of overlap, and geographic contiguity"). Many are critical of the states' choice of flags, as well. See,
e.g., Peter 'FlagDancer' Orenski, Controversial Indian Symbols on US. State Flags, TME,
http://www.tmealfcom/ICV-23.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2013); Gene Wojciechowski, South Carolina Contin-
ues to Suffer, ESPN (July 9, 2009),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist-wojciechowskigene&id=4316170 (describing South
Carolina's continuing missed opportunity to host college sporting events on account of its decision to fly the
Confederate flag).
2. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256
(2009); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010) [hereinafter
Gerken, Foreword]; Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549 (2012) [hereinafter
Gerken, Our Federlism(s)].
3. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Federalism, 52 DISSENT 64 (2005), available at
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/reclaiming-federalism.
4. I do not use "politically opportunistic" in a pejorative sense. As I have argued elsewhere, the Framers
depended on political opportunism to maintain our constitutional structure. See Emest A. Young, Welcome to
the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277(2004).
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legal academy is that advocacy of state autonomy retains a faint whiff of racism.5 1 want
to suggest, however, that the central irony of a leading progressive intellectual becoming
fascinated with federalism is actually no irony at all. In fact, as Gerken's work makes
clear, anyone seriously concerned with the well-being of minorities in a democratic soci-
ety ought to be a proponent of federalism. 6
This brief essay focuses on Professor Gerken's work, in conjunction with her for-
mer student, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, on "uncooperative federalism."7 This notion stresses
the role of state officials involved - as they often are - in the implementation of feder-
al regulatory and benefit schemes. 8 Although state officials in such a role are nominally
subservient to federal authority, they nonetheless retain considerable power to block or
slow down the implementation of federal policy, or - even more significantly - to
shape the meaning of that policy.9 Gerken and Bulman-Pozen shine a valuable spotlight
on this previously-neglected dynamic, but they acknowledge that "there is a great deal of
empirical and theoretical work needed to develop a full-blown account of uncooperative
federalism." 10 My task here is to identify some directions in which that work might pro-
ceed. I begin (in Part I) with an overview of Professor Gerken's federalism scholarship,
then sketch out (in Part II) four distinct avenues for further work.
I. PICKLED FEDERALISM
I like to think of my old nationalist friend Professor Gerken suddenly struck blind
(temporarily, of course) on the road to New Haven, as the Spirit of Federalism calls out
to her in a booming voice, "Heather, Heather, why are you persecuting Me?"I But the
truth is, her turn to federalism arises rather naturally from her more foundational com-
mitments. As a scholar who began in the voting rights area, Gerken is centrally con-
cemed with the rights of minorities and, in particular, their exercise of political power.12
And as a former clerk to Judge Stephen Reinhardt and a great admirer of Justice William
Brennan, Gerken has a soft spot in her heart for dissenters. 13 Professor Gerken's federal-
ism is all about affording dissenters not only a voice, but also an opportunity to develop
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 142-43 (1964); Seth F.
Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 66, 67 (2001) ("In my formative
years as a lawyer and legal scholar, during the late 1960s and 1970s, [federalism] was regularly invoked as a
bulwark against federal efforts to prevent racial oppression, political persecution, and police misconduct.").
This tendency continues to besmirch contemporary debates, as defenders of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA")
have sought to paint opponents of national healthcare as racists. See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner,
and the Individual Mandate, 91 B.U. L. REv. 1723, 1746-47 (2011) (comparing Virginia's arguments against
the ACA with the Commonwealth's segregationist brief in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964)).
6. See Heather K. Gerken, A New Progress Federalism, DEMOCRACY J., Spring 2012, at 37, available at
http://www.democracyjoumal.org/pdf/24/a newprogressive federalism.pdf.
7. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 2.
8. See id. at 1258-59.
9. See id. at 1271-84 (providing examples).
10. Id. at 1308.
11. Cf Acts 9:3-4.
12. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1663
(2001).
13. Professor Gerken's love of dissent may also spring from a certain degree of personal orneriness.
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and even implement their dissenting views.
As I read it, Professor Gerken's federalism scholarship has three primary elements.
The first - which explains how she got into this federalism mess to begin with - stems
from her work on "dissenting by deciding." 1 4 Gerken's basic insight was that being a vox
clamantis in deserto only gets one so far; she focused, therefore, on institutional ar-
rangements that actually afford dissenters an opportunity to instantiate their ideas by giv-
ing them power, albeit limited in time and/or scope. 15 On juries, for example, members
of minority groups may sometimes find themselves temporarily in the majority and able
to act - and wield government power - based on their dissenting beliefs.16 Federalism
sometimes offers a powerful version of this opportunity: groups that are in the minority
nationally may nonetheless constitute a majority in a particular state, so that federalism's
reservation of important governmental prerogatives to states offers those minorities an
opportunity to implement their dissenting vision.17
That opportunity, in turn, may enhance dissenters' ability to gain majority support
for views by demonstrating that those views are actually workable in practice - an op-
portunity that does not arise where dissent is confined to speech.18 As the Republican
party licks its wounds after the 2012 election, for example, it can take solace in "modest
gains" at the state level that will permit its next wave of national candidates to try out
new ideas. 19 Similarly, it seems likely that experiments by a small number of states have
contributed significantly to the sea change in American public opinion about same-sex
marriage. Even though most states went the other way on this issue - thirty-eight states
have prohibited same-sex marriage, while only nine states and the District of Columbia
recognize it20 - those "dissents by deciding" in the vanguard states provided the rest of
the nation with a real, live example of what the institution looks like in practice. The sky
did not fall, no one turned into a pillar of salt, and many Americans seem to have con-
cluded that these previously unfamiliar and slightly scary relationships looked like, well,
families. Regardless of whether the Supreme Court decides that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments require recognition of same-sex marriage, 2 1 federalism has already shifted
14. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745 (2005) [hereinafter Gerken, Dis-
senting by Deciding].
15. See id at 1748.
16. See id at 1802.
17. See id at 1754-55.
18. See id at 1766; see also Young, supra note 4, at 1286 (pointing out, in this vein, that four of our last six
presidents were governors of their states at a time "when their party was out of power at the national level").
19. See Colleen Jenkins & Jonathan Weber, Republicans Make Modest Gains in State Governor Races,
REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usa-campaign-govemors-
idUSBRE8A629R20121107.
20. Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last updated Mar. 21,
2013). Ten other states offer some form of "civil union" or domestic partnership with nearly all spousal rights
to same-sex couples. Id
21. As this essay goes to press, the Court has just heard argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry and United
States v. Windsor, and there is considerable uncertainty not only as to whether a majority exists to hold that
equal protection of the law requires recognition of same-sex marriages, but also as to whether the Court will
even reach that question in either case. See, e.g., Marty Lederman, Revisiting the Court's Several Options in the
California Marriage Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 29, 2013, 4:54 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/revisiting-the-courts-several-options-in-the-califomia-marriage-case/. Sig-
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the ground of public debate in a fundamental way.
The second component of Gerkenian federalism is its celebration of state-based
dissent within federal regulatory structures.22 Morton Grodzins famously described a
shift from "layer cake" federalism, characterized by a clear division of functions between
the levels of government, to "marble cake" federalism, under which federal and state au-
thorities share a mixture of responsibilities within particular policy areas.23 This shift
corresponds, in the legal literature, with the move from "dual" federalism, which re-
quired the Supreme Court to define and enforce sharp jurisdictional lines between federal
and state authority, and "cooperative" federalism, which enlists state and local officials
in the implementation and enforcement of federal regulatory programs.24 Because coop-
erative federalism places state officials in a subordinate role, implementing programs de-
veloped at the national level, proponents of state autonomy have generally seen this later
model as just another word for nationalism. 2 5
Professor Gerken's work on "uncooperative federalism" questions this convention-
al wisdom. Writing with Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Gerken argues that "power also resides
with states when they play the role of federal servants." 26 This power stems from several
sources. These include the "dependence" of the federal government on state officials to
administer federal programs, which gives state officials both "leverage" and "discretion
in choosing how to accomplish [their] tasks and which tasks to prioritize."27 State offi-
cials also derive power from their "integration" into federal regulatory schemes; "[w]hen
an actor is embedded in a larger system," Bulman-Pozen and Gerken argue, "a web of
connective tissues binds higher- and lower-level decisionmakers. Regular interactions
generate trust and give lower-level decisionmakers the knowledge and relationships they
need to work the system."28 Finally, Bulman-Pozen and Gerken note that state officials
"serve two masters" in the sense that although they are implementing federal policy,
"their constituencies are based within the state."29 This gives state officials both the in-
centive and the power to challenge federal officials, because they are not beholden to
federal officials for their positions and have alternative sources of resources. 30
nificantly, the oral argument in Windsor suggested that at least Justice Kennedy might be attracted to a resolu-
tion grounded in federalism rather than fundamental rights. See, e.g., Amy Howe, DOMA as a States'Rights
Problem: Today's Oral Argument in Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 27, 2013, 3:20 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=161912. On the federalism argument against DOMA, see generally Brief of
Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor, United States v. Windsor, 2013 WL
776446 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 860459 [hereinafter Brief of Federalism Scholars].
22. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 2, at 1258-59.
23. MORTON GRODZINs, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 8 (Daniel Elazar ed., 1966).
24. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing ofDual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950) (describing the end of
the dual federalism era); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism,
79 N.C. L. REv. 663, 665 (2001) (discussing cooperative federalism); see generally Ernest A. Young, The Puz-
zling Persistence of Dual Federalism, NOMOs LIV (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-2156351 [hereinafter Young, Puzzling Persistence] (contrasting these two models).
25. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autono-
my Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998).
26. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 2, at 1265.
27. Id. at 1266.
28. Id. at 1268-69.
29. Id. at 1270.
30. Id. at 1270-71.
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Although Professor Gerken and Bulman-Pozen's discussion recognizes that there
are downsides to uncooperative federalism, they plainly celebrate the ability of state offi-
cials to push back on and even occasionally thwart federal mandates. 3 1 The implemen-
tary role of states in cooperative federalism arrangements thus becomes an "administra-
tive safeguard of federalism," existing alongside the "political safeguards" emphasized
by Herbert Wechsler and his followers. 32 As I discuss further in Part II, much work re-
mains to be done to determine the precise mechanisms, motivations, and effectiveness of
state-centered dissent in the interstices of federal programs. There is no doubt, however,
that the "uncooperative federalism" dynamic provides an important component of any
understanding of the continued autonomy of state governments in an era when national
power encounters few strictly legal checks.
The third component of Professor Gerken's federalism stems from her Harvard
Law Review Foreword, which urges us to consider federalism "all the way down." 33
States are not the only institutions of decentralized power in our system, nor are they the
only - or even necessarily the best - locus for dissenting by deciding. Gerken thus
urges us to consider a wide range of decentralized institutions, including juries, school
boards, public utility boards, "and the like," as part of a federal system, broadly con-
strued. 34 This is an important insight, especially when we consider how population
growth has resulted in the scale differences between the national and state governments
in the Founding period being closer, in absolute terms, to the differences between states
and localities today than between the nation and its component states. I will concen-
trate on states in this essay because I am ultimately interested in constitutional entrench-
ment and localities have no independent constitutional existence in American law, but I
do not mean to be read as denying the importance of still more decentralized institutions
that exist "all the way down."
Professor Gerken's work not only challenges the conventional wisdom within fed-
eralism scholarship, it also challenges the conventional wisdom about federalism schol-
arship - that is, she tends to flip conventional assumptions about federalism's political
valence on their heads. There is an obvious irony about a leading liberal intellectual writ-
ing in a vein most readily associated with John C. Calhoun. Calhoun, after all, was not
31. See id. at 1280-82.
32. Id. at 1258; see Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); see also JESSE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 175 (1980).
33. See Gerken, Foreword, supra note 2.
34. Id. at 8.
35. When Madison wrote Federalist No. 51, his "extended sphere" of the national polity had about 3.9 mil-
lion people. Heads of Families at the First Census 1790: Records of the State Enumerations: 1782 to 1785,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS DECENNIAL DOCUMENTS, available at
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1790m-02.pdf. Today, approximately that many people
live in Oregon, and California is nearly ten times that big. State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlindex.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) (2012 estimates for population of Oregon
(3,899,353) and California (38,041,430)). Madison's own Virginia - the largest state in 1790 - had three-
quarters of a million people, approximately the same size as present-day San Francisco or Indianapolis. id.
(2011 estimated population of San Francisco (812,826) and Indianapolis (827,609)); Virginia: Basic Infor-
mation, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/geo/www/guidestloc/st51_va.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2013) (population of Virginia in 1790 was 821,287).
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simply a champion of states' rights but also, more specifically, a proponent of innovative
institutional designs meant to enable political minorities to exercise meaningful political
power.36 But, notwithstanding Calhoun's use of federalism to shield reactionary (and
quite unappealing) practices, I do think there is a sense in which federalism is inherently
progressive. After all, progress depends on new ideas, and it stands to reason that, at least
at its birth, any new idea will be espoused by a minority.
None of this is to say - and here I renew an old debate with Professor Gerken's
and my other co-clerk, Stuart Benjamin - that "progress" is inherently good. To a
Burkean like me, "progress" is just change, and change is just as likely (and possibly
more so) to be bad as good. Fortunately, federalism also has an inherently conservative
side, which is that by requiring change to be pursued in smaller jurisdictions we ensure
that change proceeds incrementally and the adverse effects of bad experiments are con-
fined. 3 8 As Justice Brandeis pointed out, one of the advantages of using states as policy
laboratories is that they can "try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country."39
The problem, of course, is that federalism slows down good changes and bad
changes alike. Hence the discontent from progressives with a federalist solution on gay
marriage. As that constitutional sage, Maureen Dowd, put it: "Those struck by Cupid in
places like Alabama, Arkansas and Utah will long be left either moving or saying, 'I'm
deliriously, madly in love with you, but let's leave it to the states, honey."'40 One reason
that liberals like Ms. Dowd have little use for federalism is that they compare it with an
ideal where everyone will simply do what they want (or at least the courts will make
people adopt the liberal point of view). But federalism generally arises from a recogni-
tion of imperfection - either a lack of consensus in the present or a fear of centralized
tyranny in the future. Outside the liberal bubble, reasonable people still disagree about
gay marriage, and the Court may not be ready to impose social change on the nation.41
Those cases, Professor Gerken's work suggests, are what federalism is for. 42
One of the more interesting aspects of Professor Gerken's federalism, however, is
36. See 1 JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT 39-42 (Columbia, S.C., A.S. Johnston
1851).
37. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 19 (Frank M. Turner ed.,
2003); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1182-87
(2002) (discussing the "situational" brand of conservative ideology).
38. See Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 874, 881 (2006)
(noting that "a significant advantage of state-based reform from a conservative perspective" is that "it is inher-
ently incremental from the perspective of the nation as a whole").
39. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
40. Maureen Dowd, Will Gays Be Punished for Success?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2013, at SRI 1.
41. See, e.g., David G. Savage, In Gay Marriage Cases, Court Must Balance Strong Traditions, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 30, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/30/nation/la-na-court-gay-marriage-2013033 1.
42. One misconception is that a federalism-based ruling against DOMA would hurt the constitutional case
against state-law prohibitions on same-sex marriage under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Id. ("If mar-
riage is indeed a matter for the states, then conservative states can argue they are entitled to preserve laws limit-
ing marriage to a man and a woman."). But the federalism challenge to DOMA rests on the argument that Con-
gress lacks power - as a government of limited and enumerated powers - to define marriage. See Brief of
Federalism Scholars, supra note 21. This argument would be irrelevant to the states, which possess such au-
thority as part of their general police powers. But it says nothing about whether the states' exercise of that au-
thority to exclude same-sex couples violates the Equal Protection Clause.
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the suggestion that its value is not purely instrumental. 43 An instrumental account of dis-
sent, debate, and experimentation would value those phenomena only for the purpose of
identifying the "best" arrangements, which once identified are appropriately imposed
across the board.44 Hence, Justice Brandeis's "laboratories" metaphor suggests that most
policy questions may well have a "right answer" that can be identified by conducting ex-
periments; once we know the answer, however, the obvious thing to do is to enact that
answer as national policy. As Alan Tarr has recognized, "the logic of the metaphor [sug-
gests that] the outcome of a successful policy experiment in one state laboratory should
be generalizable and should lead to adoption of the same policy in all other state labora-
tories;" hence, "the tendency would be toward policy uniformity." 4 5
Professor Gerken argues, however, that there is a further inherent democratic value
to "dissenting by deciding."46 That value lies in meliorating the majoritarian thrust of
democracy - that is, in ensuring minorities do not always have to bow to the majority
will.4 7 Constitutional lawyers are accustomed to thinking about this point in terms of
rights, which shield dissenters from majoritarian dictates in certain pre-identified spheres
of life, such as ideas, religious practice, or sexual privacy.48 A more flexible approach,
however, would simply require that there be some political communities small enough to
allow most minorities to exercise political authority on the issues of most importance to
them, thereby creating an institutional ability to vindicate a broader range of outlier pref-
erences without needing to recognize those preferences as fundamental rights. 49 This
possibility, Gerken suggests, may help make democracy tolerable to people who repeat-
edly find themselves on the losing end in larger political communities.50 In a national
society that seems fractured along intractable ideological lines, the federalist prescription
may appeal to progressives and conservatives alike.
43. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 199 HARv. L. REv. 1099,1142 (2005).
44. Id. at 1142-43.
45. G. Alan Tarr, Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism, and Scientific Management, 31
PUBLIUs 37, 42 (2001).
46. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 14, at 1747-49.
47. See id. at 1747.
48. See, e.g., W.Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("[If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith there-
in."). The actual result in Barnette, however, ought to remind us of the inadequacy of this conception. Although
Justice Jackson wrote proudly that we do not allow the government to declare an orthodoxy, that is exactly
what the Court's actual order in Barnette did: it did not enjoin the Board of Education from establishing the
Pledge of Allegiance as the orthodox position, but rather simply allowed the dissenting Jehovah's Witnesses
children to opt out of the ceremony. Id. A more secure check on government orthodoxy would have allowed the
Witnesses to incorporate as a separate political subdivision that would not have asked anyone to recite a pledge
- in other words, it would have used structural principles to permit the Witnesses to dissent by deciding. But
see Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (striking down New York's
effort to allow the Satmar Hasidim this sort of local autonomy on the ground that it violated the Establishment
Clause).
49. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 14, at 1755-56.
50. See id. at 1805.
433
7
Young: A Research Agenda for Uncooperative Federalists
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2012
TULSA LAW REVIEW
II. THE COMPLEAT (UNCOOPERATIVE) FEDERALIST
The remainder of this essay focuses on the second of the ideas discussed previous-
ly - that is, Professor Gerken's work with Jessica Bulman-Pozen on "uncooperative
federalism." 5 1 Professors Gerken and Bulman-Pozen correctly noted that the "adminis-
trative safeguards of federalism" remained "under-theorized" in prior work. 52 But having
made some progress on the theory, scholars of uncooperative federalism have difficult
questions to address. These include (a) a set of normative questions about whether (and
when) uncooperative federalism is normatively attractive; (b) questions of institutional
detail concerning how uncooperative federalism actually works under particular statutory
schemes and how constitutional doctrine might enhance it; (c) underlying motivational
questions about why state officials would want to engage in uncooperative dissenting be-
havior; (d) whether there is a parallel phenomenon of overcooperative federalism; and (e)
whether insights from the subfield of fiscal federalism, which emphasizes the importance
of maintaining a sharp distinction between state and national finances, call into question
the interlocking state and federal bureaucracies from which uncooperative federalism
arises. I do not offer definitive answers to any of these questions here. My purpose is
simply to illustrate some productive directions in which scholars interested in building on
Gerken and Bulman-Pozen's insights might pursue the inquiry further.
A. When Is Uncooperative Federalism Normatively Appealing?
As Professors Gerken and Bulman-Pozen acknowledge, one person's "power of
the servant" is another person's "agency slack." 53 When state officials charged with im-
plementing national policy behave uncooperatively, delaying or subtly altering national
goals, they act as "[un]faithful agents" to their federal principals.54 They may, of course,
be acting faithfully to the preferences of their state-level principals, and in any event un-
cooperative behavior may be beneficial to the federal system overall for all the reasons
that Gerken and Bulman-Pozen identify. 55 But, a fully developed theory of uncoopera-
tive federalism will need to address the normative questions that Gerken and Bulman-
Pozen bracket. Although their undertaking was understandably limited to identifying
previously neglected benefits of unfaithful state agency, 56 eventually scholars will need
to weigh those benefits against the costs.
A tempting answer would be to say that uncooperative federalism is beneficial to
the extent that it restores an institutional balance between the national government and
the states that has tilted in favor of the former, but unattractive to the extent it goes fur-
ther and aggrandizes the states at the expense of the nation. But this answer implicates a
perennial difficulty in federalism scholarship generally - that is, we lack both an
agreed-upon baseline for the relationship between state and federal power and ready
51. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 2.
52. Id. at 1259, 1285.
53. Id. at 1265, 1285.
54. See id. at 1262-64.
55. Id. at 1285-91.
56. See id. at 1285.
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means of measuring where the balance stands. As a descriptive matter, of course, unco-
operative federalism enriches our understanding of that relationship; it is no longer pos-
sible, for example, simply to point to the prevalence of large federal regulatory programs
as evidence that the times are out of joint, without acknowledging that the states may
well retain significant authority within the structure of those programs. 57 But it is hard to
go further without a normative baseline and good tools for measurement. That makes it
hard to say not only whether the national government is "too powerful" overall, but also
whether uncooperative federalism provides a necessary corrective to an overweening na-
tional government or, on the other hand, represents a counterproductive dynamic where-
by entrenched state government bureaucracies thwart the implementation of Congress'
legitimate purposes.
In other work, I have suggested some rough ways of assessing the overall balance
problem. 58 One might look to (1) the radical increase in the institutional capacity and
prescriptive reach of the federal government vis-i-vis the states since the Founding, as
well as (2) the failure of the Constitution's original enumerated powers strategy to cabin
national authority, as clues that contemporary federalism doctrine ought to look primarily
to limiting, not expanding principles.59 But this approach offers only a very rough intui-
tion, and will convince no one who does not share my sense that the Constitution's past
allocation of authority retains some claim on us today.60
A more fruitful approach might be to analyze particular areas of regulatory policy
and ask whether the implementary role of state officials is preserving a productive inter-
play between state and national power or stymieing efforts by federal authorities to re-
spond to national concerns.61 This would accord with broader theories, such as Robert
Schapiro's notion of "polyphonic" federalism, that see federalism as simply a potential-
ly-useful set of institutional arrangements for furthering national policy goals.62 It would
take, however, national goals as necessarily primary - an approach at odds both with
the specific wording of the Supremacy Clause, which accords supreme status to national
law, not policy, and with a tradition that sees checks and balances as a central virtue of a
federal system.63
57. An example of this is the administration of Medicaid by states. See generally APRIL GRADY, CONGR.
RESEARCH SERV., RS22101, STATE MEDICAID PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW (2008).
58. See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compen-
sating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733 (2005).
59. Id. at 1806-09.
60. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997) (rejecting the efforts to adjust
current doctrines in order to preserve fidelity to the Constitution's original arrangements).
61. Stephen Sugarman has suggested another possible pathology, which is that uncooperative federalism
allows national politicians to avoid responsibility for undermining national regulatory or benefit schemes by
delegating implementing authority to state officials who are likely to subvert the programs in question. See Ste-
phen D. Sugarman, Welfare Reform and the Cooperative Federalism of America's Public Income Transfer
Programs, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 123, 147 (1996) (criticizing the devolution of implementation authority
over national welfare programs to the states and arguing that "by passing off the responsibility elsewhere, these
legislators are hoping that the states, or at least some of them, will do the sort of dirty work that Congress dare
not do").
62. See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS (2009) (focusing on federalism's usefulness for furthering the national goal of protecting fundamental
rights).
63. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); Ernest A. Young, Federalism as a Constitutional
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A variant of the question that responds to this objection would be to ask whether
state officials that resist federal authority in a particular field are themselves furthering a
distinctive state policy with democratic legitimacy within that jurisdiction, or instead
simply thwarting federal mandates in such a way as to prevent the implementation of any
coherent policy.64 Even worse, state officials might be seeking to further a state policy
that has been explicitly rejected as a matter of binding national law. For example, it must
be acknowledged that one prominent example of uncooperative federalism is the "mas-
sive resistance" of southern officials to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board
of Education.6 5 The federal courts that ordered southern school districts to desegregate,
after all, were in no position to actually take over the administration of southern school
districts on a day-to-day basis. The result was that southern officials were able to main-
tain a largely segregated system for decades, Brown notwithstanding.66
On the other hand, uncooperative state-level behavior may supply a valuable coun-
terpoint in an ongoing conversation over national policy. Contemporary delegation theo-
ry posits that Congress frequently punts many difficult questions of statutory detail and
implementation to federal administrative agencies.67 Much of the "uncooperation" that
Professors Gerken and Bulman-Pozen describe will occur over these interstitial, but fre-
quently critical, points.68 Pushback from state officials against federal agency directives
in these circumstances is not as obviously troubling as state attempts to evade choices
that Congress itself has made; after all, Congress will generally have explicitly mandated
a role for state officials working alongside federal ones.69 And if Congress wants to
evade political responsibility by punting to agencies, state agencies that are closer to the
people they govern may be more appealing receivers than federal bureaucrats. Even if
they are not, such bifurcated delegations may produce valuable checks and balances
within the implementing bureaucracy.
In any event, we are unlikely ever to reach full closure on these normative ques-
tions, because in order to fully establish whether and when uncooperative federalism is
normatively attractive we would have to reach agreement on the most intractable under-
lying normative issues with federalism generally. I expect that the most fruitful lines of
Principle (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). For a critique of the European doctrine of "subsidiari-
ty" from a similar perspective - that is, that subsidiarity errs by asking only whether decentralized implemen-
tation would best further goals of the community as a whole - see Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong
Idea, in the Wrong Place at the Wrong Time, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 63 (2006).
64. See, e.g., JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: How STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN
NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 210 (2009) ("One must obviously take care to distinguish between responsible and
irresponsible use of state administrative discretion. There is nothing to celebrate when states shirk their legal
responsibilities by resisting federal laws and regulations intended to remedy pressing social, economic, envi-
ronmental, and other problems.").
65. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE
UNITED STATES, 1945-1974, at 392-99 (1996) (quoting NUMAN BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE
RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950s (1969)) (discussing the southern reaction
to Brown).
66. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 42-
57(1991).
67. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 7-17
(1982).
68. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 2, at 1266-67.
69. See id at 1268.
436 Vol. 48:427
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 48 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol48/iss3/3
2013 A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISTS
inquiry will pursue a more modest agenda, focused on separating out uncooperative be-
havior that furthers distinctive policy agendas originating at the state level, or that checks
federal agency overreaching from behavior that reflects good old agency shirking or cap-
ture, or that contravenes basic federal statutory or constitutional requirements.
B. What Are the Mechanisms of Uncooperative Federalism?
Although Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken provide a number of real-world
examples of uncooperative federalism, their discussion makes clear that the opportunities
for and the form taken by such behavior will vary depending on the contours of specific
federal statutory schemes. 70 Future scholars need to get more specific about the various
mechanisms that facilitate the states' "power of the servant."7 1 We need to know more
about how uncooperative federalism operates in practice, so that we can assess means
either to enhance or to mitigate it going forward.72 This second question - how to im-
prove the relationships whereby states implement federal law - has both a doctrinal and
an institutional design component. Courts may tailor their doctrinal tools to facilitate
state resistance, and legislators and executive officials designing new implementation
schemes should be informed by the role of those schemes as a safeguard of federalism.
Some valuable work in this vein has already been done. Fairly extensive political
science literature confirms the basic insight of uncooperative federalism.73 As John
Dilulio and Donald Kettl put it,
[A]n entire generation of empirical research on intergovernmental affairs reveals
that ... Washington has had, and continues to have, tremendous difficulty in exe-
cuting even relatively straightforward policies precisely because state and local
governments enjoy such wide latitude in deciding how best to translate federal
policies into action, or whether, in fact, to follow federal policies at all. The em-
pirical evidence on this point is simply overwhelming. 74
John Nugent's recent book on the means by which states protect their interests in the na-
tional policymaking process includes a substantial chapter focusing on state implementa-
tion of federal policy.75 Professor Nugent identified a number of specific mechanisms by
which states influence federal regulation:
Participation in Agency Rulemaking;
Influencing Presidential Executive Orders;
Negotiation of State Implementation Plans;
State Authority to Determine Program Funding;
State Authority to Determine Program Eligibility;
State Applications for Waivers of Federal Requirements; and
70. See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 61, at 124 (describing federal income transfer programs as a "bewilder-
ing hodgepodge of programs, each with its own special allocation of intergovernmental relationships").
71. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 2, at 1265.
72. See Young, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 24, at 45.
73. See, e.g., JOHN J. DIlULIO, JR. & DONALD F. KETTL, FINE PRINT: THE CONTRACT WITH AMERICA,
DEVOLUTION, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE REALITIES OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 18 (1995).
74. Id.
75. See NUGENT, supra note 64, at 168-212.
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Street-level Bureaucrats' Discretion to Implement Federal Policy. 76
There remains room, of course, for more work in this vein. In particular, it would be
helpful to have comparative studies of which particular regulatory structures accord op-
portunities for effective state-based dissent and which leave state officials with relatively
little voice. Conversely, we also need to know more about the options that national offi-
cials have for disciplining uncooperative states.
Legal scholars may have important contributions to make as the literature moves
from institutional description to questions of judicial doctrine and institutional design.
Professors Gerken and Bulman-Pozen took a stab at some of the doctrinal questions,
proposing that courts could enhance the uncooperative federalism dynamic by strength-
ening the presumption against preemption of state law in statutory construction cases and
by overruling the anti-commandeering doctrine. 77 Both of these prescriptions warrant
further exploration. With respect to preemption, Gerken and Bulman-Pozen say that "un-
cooperative federalism underscores the value of state statutes and regulations that occupy
the same terrain as federal law, and it would push the Court to tolerate a degree of con-
flict between such laws and their federal counterparts." 78 I certainly agree with this pre-
scription, having long urged the Court to strengthen its presumption against preemption79
and to recognize, in the important category of conflict preemption cases, that such a pre-
sumption necessarily means tolerating a certain degree of conflict between federal and
state policy. 80
An emphasis on preemption does not obviously fit, however, with the phenomenon
of uncooperative federalism as Professors Gerken and Bulman-Pozen have described it.
They place their theory in contrast to an "autonomy model" that emphasizes the inde-
pendent policymaking authority of the states. 8 1 "Preemption is a problem when viewed
through the lens of uncooperative federalism," they argue, "not because it deprives states
of the chance to regulate separate and apart from the federal scheme, but because it push-
es states to the edges of national policymaking and reduces the number of ties that bind
state and national officials." 82 But the administrative linkages between state and federal
officials in the examples Gerken and Bulman-Pozen cite are attenuated at best.83 In Gon-
76. See id. at 178-93.
77. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 2, at 1295-1307.
78. Id. at 1303.
79. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 130-34 (2004)
[hereinafter Young, Two Federalisms]; Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 1349, 1381-86 (2001) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers].
80. See Ernest A. Young, "The Ordinary Diet of the Law": The Presumption Against Preemption in the
Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REv. 253, 264-69.
81. For development of the autonomy model, see Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 79, at 13-15. Pro-
fessor Gerken's allergy to the autonomy model rests, in my view, on a misapprehension of what it entails. The
point is to stress the states' affirmative capacity to govern and make policy choices that are responsive to their
constituents, in contrast to models that stress the inviolability of state institutions and their immunity from fed-
eral commands. See id This sort of autonomy is a necessary predicate to "dissenting by deciding." The auton-
omy model does not depend on carving out distinct spheres of state responsibility, and in fact uncooperative
state officials exercising their discretion as federal agents may further the cause of state autonomy to the extent
that their actions enhance the states' own authority to govern.
82. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 2, at 1304.
83. See id. at 1305.
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zales v. Oregon, the Court considered the national Attorney General's effort to preempt
Oregon's law permitting physician-assisted suicide by promulgating an interpretive rule
stating that certain drugs could not be used for that practice under the federal Controlled
Substances Act ("CSA").84 The Court rejected that rule as unauthorized by the CSA,
noting that "[t]he structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a function-
ing medical profession regulated under the States' police powers."85 The CSA does not,
however, establish a cooperative federalism scheme as the term is generally understood;
state regulators of the medical profession are not part of an integrated enforcement bu-
reaucracy with federal officials at the Department of Justice comparable to the integrated
institutional structure created by the Clean Water Act and similar statutes.86 Hence, Ore-
gon's Death with Dignity Act was not an exercise of state officials dissenting in the
course of their implementation of a federal regulatory regime - it was simply a free-
standing state law, enacted by the state legislature.8 7
Consider a paradigmatic modem preemption case like Wyeth v. Levine, in which
the Court held the federal Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") prior approval of a
prescription drug's label did not preempt a subsequent state tort claim for failure to warn
of a harmful side effect. The state action alleged to be preempted in Wyeth did not in-
volve state administrative officials at all; rather, the defendant drug manufacturer com-
plained of the potential action of a state court applying principles of state common law. 89
State judges and juries do not participate in the sort of interlocking federal-state bureau-
cracy that Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken celebrate in Uncooperative Federal-
ism.90 Nonetheless, I think the preemption cases usefully point us toward a broader ver-
sion of the uncooperative model. Such a model would need to encompass a creative
tension not only within a particular federal regulatory regime, like state officials imple-
menting the Clean Water Act under Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") supervi-
84. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 248-49 (2006); see Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 2, at
1305-06.
85. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 270.
86. Compare The Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2012), with The Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012).
87. The same can be said of Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken's other examples. See Bulman-Pozen &
Gerken, supra note 2, at 1306-07. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992), involved a
state licensing statute with environmental requirements that the Court found preempted by federal standards
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor under the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"). Id. The state
officials who enacted and enforced the licensing act did not do so as part of any delegated responsibility to im-
plement the OSHA. Id. at 101. Likewise, the state officials who enacted the California and Massachusetts stat-
utes found preempted in Am. Ins. Assn v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003), and Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 371 (2000), were not charged with implementing national human rights policy in
cooperation with federal officials at the state department; indeed, the Court seems to have found preemption
based on a fear that any state involvement in foreign policy would be necessarily pernicious. Similarly, the
Massachusetts law regulating tobacco ads near schools found preempted in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 532 (2001), was not part of a cooperative federalism scheme under which state officials participated
in enforcing FDA regulations of tobacco products.
88. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009).
89. Id. at 597-98.
90. The closest that state and federal courts come to such a relationship is probably in the criminal context,
where the lower federal courts engage in collateral review of state convictions via the writ of habeas corpus.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463-64 (1953) (holding that federal courts
exercising habeas review may relitigate issues already considered by the state courts). The uncooperative feder-
alism model may well offer an interesting lens for assessing this relationship.
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sion, but also between state and federal regulatory regimes involving multiple kinds of
institutional actors operating within the same policy space.
Wyeth is a good example. As the Court noted,
[T]he FDA traditionally regarded state law as a complementary form of drug
regulation. The FDA has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the
market, and manufacturers have superior access to information about their drugs,
especially in the postmarketing phase as new risks emerge. State tort suits uncover
unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose
safety risks promptly. They also serve a distinct compensatory function that may
motivate injured persons to come forward with information. Failure-to-warn ac-
tions, in particular, lend force to the FDCA's premise that manufacturers, not the
FDA, bear primary responsibility for their drug labeling at all times. Thus, the
FDA long maintained that state law offers an additional, and important, layer of
consumer protection that complements FDA regulation.9 1
The Court's description of FDA and state tort regulation as "complementary" masks the
fact that there is a conflict here: the FDA had approved Wyeth's label as adequate, while
state tort law threatened to conclude that it was inadequate.92 What Bulman-Pozen and
Gerken's model of uncooperative federalism adds to traditional discussions of preemp-
tion, then, is a necessary tolerance for conflict between federal and state policy. The pre-
scription drug regime works, as the Court points out, precisely because it allows state
courts to come in after a tragic accident and determine that the FDA's initial judgment on
a warning label was insufficient to protect the public.9 3 In other words, public safety
benefits from the potential for disagreement between state and federal regulators, and
that disagreement may well be informed by the fact that state regulators are often differ-
ent sorts of institutions - e.g., judges and juries - than federal agencies.
Uncooperative federalism thus has the potential to enhance our understanding of
preemption doctrine in ways that go beyond Professor Bulman-Pozen and Gerken's de-
fense of the presumption against preemption. I am more skeptical of their criticism of the
anti-commandeering doctrine, which holds that Congress may not require state officials
to implement federal law. 94 Gerken and Bulman-Pozen argue for a regime in which
Congress could commandeer state officials: "A strong proponent of uncooperative feder-
alism would embrace commandeering not because it increases national power or furthers
federal-state cooperation, as most proponents of commandeering would have it, but be-
cause it facilitates challenges to federal policy." 95 They explain that:
While autonomy scholars reasonably find it distasteful to make state officials im-
plement federal policies they disagree with, they ignore how this dynamic may in
fact generate more democratic friction and debate over the federal scheme. We
91. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 578-79 (citations omitted). See also Brief for Constitutional and Administrative Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 28-30, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (No. 06-
1249).
92. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 558-59.
93. Id at 574-76.
94. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
188 (1992). See also Young, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 24, at 22.
95. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 2, at 1297.
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see, in short, yet another example of the classic tradeoff between voice and exit. 96
This "No Exit" theory of commandeering makes sense if we envision the alternative to
be a world in which the national government simply implements federal regulatory re-
gimes on its own. 97 And it may well be that, in some cases, Congress will respond to its
inability to commandeer by creating an exclusively federal administrative bureaucracy.
But it is hard to think of many examples.98 Even before New York and Printz articulated
the anti-commandeering doctrine, the overwhelming majority of federal enforcement re-
gimes did rely on state cooperation and secured that cooperation through either condi-
tional spending or conditional preemption - that is, states agreed to implement federal
law either to secure federal funding or to avoid being subject to a federal regulatory re-
gime in which they had no say.
It seems more likely, then, that states generally will agree to implement federal
regulatory schemes, but that the anti-commandeering doctrine allows them to bargain
more effectively over the shape of those schemes and state officials' role within them.
Under current law, federal officials must consider the views of state officials during at
least two stages. In the pre-legislation stage, federal officials must design federal regula-
tory schemes in such a way as to attract state participation - and probably in consulta-
tion with state officials. 99 In the implementation stage, interactions between federal and
state officials take place in the shadow of state exit options - that is, if state officials can
credibly threaten to cease participation, federal officials must either compromise or con-
template implementing the federal scheme on their own.10 0 Given that federal agencies
typically do not have the resources (administrative or political) to implement most feder-
al programs on their own, the threat of state exit seems likely to enhance state voice.
At the end of the day, the entitlement to commandeer, just like the entitlement to
impose exclusively federal regulation, might not be exercised very often even if it were
formally available. But as work on the Coase theorem has demonstrated, the initial allo-
96. Id. at 1299 (citations omitted).
97. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("By limiting the ability of the Federal Gov-
ernment to enlist state officials in the implementation of its programs, the Court creates incentives for the Na-
tional Government to aggrandize itself. In the name of State's rights, the majority would have the Federal Gov-
ernment create vast national bureaucracies to implement its policies.").
98. The federal Department of Health and Human Services has announced that it will enforce the market
reform provisions of the Affordable Care Act in at least four states, but only after those states declined the op-
tion to implement the Act themselves. See Jason Millman, Feds Will Need to Enforce ACA Reforms in 4 States,
POLITICO (Mar. 19, 2013, 4:43 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/feds-must-enforce-aca-reforms-in-
four-states-89041.html. In Printz itself, the federal statute envisioned using state and local officials to conduct
background checks on would-be firearms purchasers only for an interim period until a fully federal computer
database would be up and running. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902-03. But it seems unlikely that Congress made
this choice in response to the anti-commandeering doctrine, which at that point had not been extended to state
executive officials. And in any event, Printz's holding hardly put an end to federal-state cooperation in the field
of firearms enforcement. See, e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms, NAT'L INTEGRATED BALLISTIC
INFO. NETWORK, http://www.nibin.gov/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (describing institutional framework for fed-
eral, state, and local cooperation in tracing firearms ballistics information).
99. See, e.g., NUGENT, supra note 64, at 116-18, 180-82 (describing state participation in the drafting of
federal legislation and in the promulgation of federal administrative rules).
100. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183,
1224 (1995) ("Although it has as much legal authority as it needs, the federal government cannot implement its
air pollution program without the substantial resources, expertise, information, and political support of state and
local officials.").
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cation of an entitlement does have distributional effects on the bargains eventually
reached through negotiation. 10 1 We would thus expect the balance of power between
federal and state officials to be affected by whether, as a baseline, Congress begins with
the power to commandeer or the states begin with the power to walk.
A final line of doctrinal inquiry concerns a power that Professors Bulman-Pozen
and Gerken do not address - the spending power. Congress has extensive power to re-
quire states that accept federal funding to comply with certain conditions, even if Con-
gress would lack the power to impose those conditions directly.102 The states' desire to
maintain federal grants thus gives federal officials a powerful source of leverage in their
interactions with state officials. 103 One of the looming questions in federalism jurispru-
dence over the past quarter century has concerned whether there are, in fact, any consti-
tutional limitations on this power. It seems likely that, from an uncooperative federalism
perspective, we should favor some degree of limitation on the conditional spending pow-
er in order to ensure that federal officials cannot simply overwhelm state officials' disa-
greement through fiscal sanctions. 104
Uncooperative federalists will particularly want to address the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius ("NFIB"),
which somewhat surprisingly struck down a spending condition requiring states to partic-
ipate in a significant expansion of Medicaid or risk forfeiting all federal Medicaid fund-
ing. 10 5 Two variables seemed important to the Court in NFIB: first, the dollar amounts
involved were very large,106 and second, the Medicaid expansion provisions of the Af-
fordable Care Act ("ACA") imposed new conditions on old money. They did not, in oth-
er words, simply condition the additional Medicaid funding provided by the ACA on
states' agreement to participate in the expansion, but they required non-participating
states to forego pre-existing Medicaid funding as well. 107 If the first of these variables -
the sheer amount of money involved - turns out to be critical, then NFIB's Spending
Clause holding may turn out to be a ticket for this day and train only. But if the old mon-
ey/new money distinction has legs, then this may allow the states to effect partial opt-
outs from federal spending programs. That potential should be of interest to uncoopera-
tive federalists because it would allow state officials implementing federal programs a
considerably greater degree of flexibility to disagree with elements of federal policy
101. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427, 432-33 (1972).
102. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (providing a test for the use of the federal spend-
ing power to bring about state regulatory action); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995).
103. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 102, at 1935-54 (exploring the reasons why national authorities have so
much leverage over the states through conditional spending).
104. See generally Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 79, at 141-47.
105. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. V. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
106. See id at 2604 ("A State that opts out of the Affordable Care Act's expansion in health care coverage
thus stands to lose not merely 'a relatively small percentage' of its existing Medicaid funding, but all of it.
Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State's total budget, with federal funds covering
50 to 83 percent of those costs." (internal citation omitted) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211)).
107. See id. at 2607 ("Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable
Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that States accepting such funds comply with
the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in
that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.").
442 Vol. 48:427
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 48 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol48/iss3/3
2013 A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISTS
without exiting the program altogether.
Finally, the most important avenues of inquiry may involve not judicial doctrine,
but the institutional design questions that arise in the course of fashioning and revising
cooperative federalism arrangements. I have argued elsewhere that the vast majority of
institutional arrangements that "constitute" our federalism are embodied not in the ca-
nonical Constitution itself, but rather in the statutory and regulatory arrangements that
establish the federal bureaucracy and its relationship with state law and institutions of
state government. 108 The fact that so much of our federal architecture is not constitution-
ally entrenched suggests that constitutional lawyers should spend more time thinking
about institutional design. 109 In particular, uncooperative federalists should consider how
federal regulatory schemes could be designed to promote constructive disagreement be-
tween state and federal officials. Thus far, for example, we know relatively little about
which particular institutional structures might maximize opportunities for state officials
to voice their disagreement and implement their own distinctive versions of federal poli-
cy while nonetheless minimizing opportunities to simply shirk or pursue idiosyncratic
agendas with little grounding in the state political community. Professors Gerken and
Bulman-Pozen have taken the essential first step by offering an account of why uncoop-
erative state behaviors may be legitimate; what remains is to investigate how to facilitate
and channel state disagreement into its optimal form.
C. What Are the Wellsprings ofState-Based Dissent?
Thus far we have largely taken for granted the probability that state officials im-
plementing federal law will have their own distinctive values, preferences, and policy
agendas, and that they will seek to influence the implementation of federal law in ways
that respond to these preferences. In this section, however, I want to ask where those dis-
tinctive preferences come from, and what they can tell us about the nature and value of
state-based dissent.
We might begin with a prior question: why value state-based dissent? Much of the
literature on state policymaking under the auspices of federal regulatory and benefit pro-
grams stresses Justice Brandeis's notion of the states as laboratories, 110 which suggests
that states may use the leeway afforded them in implementing federal law to develop pol-
icy innovations that might then prove suitable for uniform adoption at the national lev-
el. 111 States may also disagree with their federal counterparts not so much because they
have some distinctive innovation they wish to try out, but simply because they are closer
to the on-the-ground realities of policy implementation. Some of the pushback by state
administrators against aspects of the No Child Left Behind program seems to have fit this
108. See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007).
109. See Ernest A. Young, The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions: A Research
Agenda, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 399 (2008).
110. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labor-
atory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
111. See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 61, at 140 ("Federalism is often lauded as a spark for innovation and
experimentation in government . . . The notion seems to be that . .. over time, one would expect a convergence
on policies that prove successful.").
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description, for example. 112 State-based dissent may also arise because state officials
have different constituencies. Many state executive officials are independently elected
and thus have a different perspective than federal bureaucrats. Moreover, a given state
may reflect a different mix of policy preferences than the nation as a whole, so that state
officials may feel pressure to bend policy in a somewhat different direction than that pre-
ferred by the supervising federal agency.
The different reasons to value state-based dissent thus reflect divergent sources for
state disagreements with federal officials. And each distinct source of state-based dissent
raises different issues for students of uncooperative federalism. When we value state ex-
perimentation, for example, the question will be how to design federal programs to en-
courage innovation, evaluate its results, and integrate the lessons of state experiments in-
to national policy. When state administrators have better access to the facts and practical
realities of implementation, on the other hand, the issue will be how to ensure a prompt
feedback loop between on-the-ground implementers and national policymakers, while
ensuring that we do not build in so much leeway as to create opportunities for shirking
and sheer recalcitrance.
Different issues arise when state-based dissent stems from the distinct constituen-
cies of state officials. Contemporary administrative law is dominated by questions about
the legitimacy and accountability of federal agencies,113 which are staffed exclusively by
appointed officials, most of whom serve at the pleasure of the President. State officials
are not only not under the thumb of the President, but they are, in many cases, inde-
pendently elected; most states, in other words, do not have a unitary executive. 114 State
officials who are not directly accountable to the President and have their own source of
electoral legitimacy are exotic animals in the administrative law zoo, and modem admin-
istrative law needs to take into account that officials of this kind play a prominent role in
the administration of federal law. 115
Finally, there is the fact that state officials' constituencies will frequently have
preferences that diverge from the aggregate national preferences reflected (hopefully) by
national statutory schemes and agency positions. This may occur simply because the
state political community will reflect a different mix of partisan affiliations, interest
groups, and ethnic, religious, and racial identities than does the overall national elec-
torate. On this view, states are different from one another simply because they slice the
national electorate in different ways. As Michael McConnell has shown, this non-
uniform geographical distribution of preferences affords decentralized governments a
chance to please a higher proportion of the electorate than would be possible if a uniform
112. See NUGENT, supra note 64, at 195-200.
113. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Adminis-
trative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461 (2003).
114. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Separation ofPowers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1337,
1347 (1990).
115. A related problem concerns judicial review of actions by state officials implementing federal law. Such
review performs an analogous function to review of federal agency action under the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"). But cases construing private rights to sue state officials charged with responsibilities under feder-
al regulatory schemes generally have not proceeded with the APA analogy in mind. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v.
Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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policy were mandated from Washington, D.C.11 6 The question will be when it is legiti-
mate for policy to vary to reflect these local differences, and when such dis-uniformities
go too far to undermine the federal scheme.
It is possible, however, that preferences of state officials diverge from those of fed-
eral officials, not simply because each state encompasses a different mix of Republicans
and Democrats, Catholics and Protestants, etc., but also because states embody a distinc-
tive and meaningful identity of their own. As a native Texan, I find this possibility more
plausible than does Professor Gerken, who had the misfortune to grow up in Massachu-
setts and now lives in Connecticut. Much of the contemporary federalism literature takes
for granted that meaningful state political communities do not exist; Edward Rubin, for
example, has confidently asserted that
At present, the United States is a socially homogenized and politically centralized
nation. Regional differences between different parts of the nation are minimal,
and those that exist are based on inevitable economic variations, rather than any
historical or cultural distinctions.... With the minor exceptions of Utah and Ha-
waii, there is no American state with a truly distinctive social profile. . . . Our po-
litical culture is more uniform still. . .. Most important, the primary political loy-
alty of the vast majority of Americans is to the nation.117
Rubin's assertion will no doubt seem intuitive to many law professors, who tend
to move around a lot and focus on matters of national law. But it is nonetheless an empir-
ical assumption offered without any sort of empirical proof. And it flies in the face of a
great deal of counter-evidence. That counter-evidence, which I survey at some length
elsewhere,118 includes public opinion research indicating that a person's state is a strong
predictor of partisan and ideological affiliation, even after controlling for economic, de-
mographic, and similar factors;119 survey evidence that Americans tend to place consid-
erably more trust in their state and local governments than in the federal government, 120
and that they value the autonomy of state governments even when that autonomy may
cut against their substantive political views;121 an extensive political science literature on
state political culture;122 and a longstanding literary tradition celebrating the distinctive-
ness of particular states.123
116. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
1484, 1493 (1987).
117. Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 37, 45-46 (2001).
118. See Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? Sovereignty and Political Community in Europe and the
United States (Summer 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
119. ROBERT S. ERIKSON, GERALD C. WRIGHT & JOHN P. MCIVER, STATEHOUSE DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC
OPINION AND POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES (1993).
120. See Megan Mullin, Federalism, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 209 (Na-
thaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008).
121. See Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens Care About Federalism? An Experimental Test, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 589 (2007).
122. See, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (3d ed. 1984); Samu-
el C. Patterson, The Political Cultures of the American States, 30 J. POL. 187 (1968).
123. See, e.g., STATE BY STATE: A PANORAMIC PORTRAIT OF AMERICA (Matt Weiland & Sean Wilsey eds.,
2008); THESE UNITED STATES: ORIGINAL ESSAYS BY LEADING AMERICAN WRITERS ON THEIR STATE WITHIN
THE UNION (John Leonard ed., 2004).
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The point of interest for uncooperative federalists is that state-based dissent may be
more effective to the extent that it is grounded in a meaningful state political community,
rather than merely arising from a divergence of the state-level correlation of political
forces from those prevailing at the national level. If state officials' disagreements with
federal mandates arise from something enduring in the character of a particular state, for
example, one would expect those disagreements to survive changes in administration at
the state level. More fundamentally, Albert Hirschman's work - on which Professor
Gerken frequently reliesl24 - suggests that "loyalty" is often necessary to activate
"voice."l25 As he explains, we might ordinarily expect persons discontented with some
aspect of a governmental regime simply to exit; loyalty is what encourages them to stay
and instead work to reform the regime from within.126 Adventurously, if we value state-
based dissent, then perhaps we should consider ways to strengthen the state-level politi-
cal community.
D. What About Overcooperative Federalism?
States will not always resist enforcing federal law. In fact, they may sometimes
wish to enforce federal law more aggressively than do federal officials. We might de-
scribe this phenomenon as "overcooperative federalism."l27 What happens when states
exercise the "power of the servant" to be overzealous, rather than shirking their duty? As
the distinguished federalism scholar Shel Silverstein put it, "some kind of help is the kind
of help that helping's all about. And some kind of help is the kind of help we all could do
without."
128
Recent disputes over state efforts to enforce federal immigration laws illustrate this
point. Federal law sharply limits the number of legal immigrants who may come to the
United States and prohibits them from working legally if they do come to our country. 12 9
But the federal Executive has generally exercised considerable discretion concerning the
rigor with which these laws are enforced and the federal resources devoted to such en-
forcement.130 In recent years, however, a number of states have displayed an interest in
playing an enforcement role in this area.131 Sometimes, the states have followed the tra-
ditional pattern of cooperative federalism. Federal law presently allows states to enter
into agreements with federal immigration authorities whereby states exercise delegated
124. See, e.g., Gerken, Our Federalism(s), supra note 2, at 1556.
125. See ALBERT 0. HIRscHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 76-100 (1970).
126. Id. at 77-79.
127. I am indebted to Rocio Perez, Duke Law '11, for this term and its application to immigration enforce-
ment.
128. Shel Silverstein, Helping, in FREE TO BE ... YOU AND ME 60-61 (Carole Hart et al., eds., 1974).
129. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2012) (imposing sanctions for employers who hire illegal workers).
130. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) ("The dynamic nature of relations with other
countries require the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation's
foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.").
131. See id. at 2497 (stating that in 2012 Arizona enacted a state statute directed specifically at "discour-
age[ing] and deter[ing] the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity of persons unlawfully
present in the United States") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
446 Vol. 48:427
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 48 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol48/iss3/3
2013 A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISTS
enforcement authority under federal supervision.132 But some states have attempted to
enforce federal immigration laws outside this explicit delegation of federal authority,
without direct federal supervision.133 Most prominently, Arizona and several other states
have enacted state law prohibitions that largely mirrored federal immigration laws and
charged state executive officials with far-reaching authority to enforce those prohibi-
tions. 134 Although the U.S. Supreme Court struck down much of the Arizona statute in
Arizona v. United States,135 that decision seems unlikely to end the national debate over
state enforcement of restrictions on illegal immigration.136
Other examples of potentially overcooperative federalism exist that may have a dif-
ferent valence politically. State attorneys general frequenty sue to enforce federal law on
behalf of their citizens, providing a level of enforcement beyond that achieved by federal
governmental enforcement standing alone. 137 State attorneys general may also use their
investigatory powers under state law to bring violations of federal law to light and pres-
sure federal regulators to act.138 As Attorney General of New York, for example, Eliot
Spitzer famously exposed abusive practices on Wall Street in the face of perceived abdi-
cation by the federal Securities Exchange Commission. 139 Any of these activities may
well be unwelcome to federal regulators in particular circumstances.
In these sorts of contexts, overcooperative federalism may serve important separa-
tion of powers values. State enforcement of federal law in cases like Arizona's poses a
potentially valuable check on the national executive's discretionary enforcement of fed-
eral law. We ordinarily think of prosecutorial discretion as a central component of execu-
tive authority; anything that interferes with that discretion seems like an undesirable -
and potentially unconstitutional - intrusion on that authority. But the President and his
officers exercise enforcement discretion in a wide variety of forms, and not all of them fit
comfortably with traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion. It may be that some of
these more adventurous forms of discretion - such as the power not to defend a con-
gressional enactment that the President thinks is unconstitutional,140 or an effort to make
federal immigration policy more lenient generally by reining in enforcementl41 - are
themselves valuable in some circumstances. But it may also be valuable to have an ex-
132. These agreements take place under § 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act of 1996. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(g)(1) (2012).
133. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492.
134. Id. at 2497.
135. Id. at 2510-1l.
136. The Court's decision left one important provision of the Arizona law in place, pending as-applied chal-
lenges once the law is enforced. Id. at 2510. Moreover, the Court rejected a federal preemption challenge to
another Arizona law regulating employment of undocumented aliens a year earlier in Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). For a survey of states with similar legislation and pending challenges to that
legislation, see State Omnibus Immigration Legislation and Legal Challenges, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 27, 2012), http://ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/omnibus-immigration-legislation.aspx.
137. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State At-
torneys General, 126 HARV. L. REv. 486, 488 (2012).
138. Id. at 492-93.
139. See, e.g., Justin O'Brien, The Politics of Enforcement: Eliot Spitzer, State-Federal Relations, and the
Redesign ofFinancial Regulation, 35 PUBLius 449 (2005); Michael S. Greve, Free Eliot Spitzer!, AEI ONLINE
(May 1, 2002), http://www.aei.org/article/economics/free-eliot-spitzer/.
140. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183 (2012).
141. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492.
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ternal check on those discretionary judgments.14 2
While a state's decision to enforce federal law may well conflict with the execu-
tive's determination that the underlying statute is unconstitutional or does not make good
policy sense, that determination may itself be in conflict with Congress's judgment. To
the extent that the national Executive's discretion not to enforce federal statutes strength-
ens the President's hand vis-A-vis Congress, then, state enforcement of those statutes
may shift the balance back in Congress' favor. 143 Whether such shifts are desirable is, of
course, another question. Congress has other means of checking executive non-
enforcement through oversight, confirmation hearings, and budgetary processes.144 As
the Arizona example illustrates, however, we need to consider state enforcement poten-
tial as one more possible limitation on Executive non-enforcement.
E. Let Them Eat Marble Cake? Challenges from Competitive and Fiscal Federalism.
Federalism scholarship has long been dominated by baking metaphors. Commenta-
tors often described the ancien rigime of dual federalism, which divided the world into
separate and exclusive spheres of national and state authority as a "layer cake."1 45 Mor-
ton Grodzins then famously described the cooperative federalism that succeeded dual
federalism as "marble cake," with state and federal activity pervasively swirled around
and blended together.146 By celebrating the state-protective aspects of cooperative feder-
alism regimes, Professor Gerken places herself firmly in the marble cake camp. But de-
spite Gerken's well-deserved reputation as a great cook, it is not entirely clear that mar-
ble cake is something that good federalists ought to swallow. Marble cake might be more
like, well, fruitcake - good looking on the outside, but nearly indigestible once one digs
in.
The foundational question is whether uncooperative federalism is really a theory of
federalism at all. That word, of course, can and has been used in a number of senses. I
use it here in the sense that Dean Rubin and Professor Feeley do, that is, that "federal-
ism" requires some degree of constitutional entrenchment in order to distinguish it from
mere "decentralization."l47 I take that to mean that the federal arrangement must not on-
142. This is especially true if we limit the standing of other actors to defend government policies. See, e.g.,
Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing Jurisdiction, United States v. Windsor, 2013 WL 776446
(2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 315234 (challenging the standing of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group to
defend DOMA where the Department of Justice has elected not to defend the statute). Defense by other actors
would itself serve as a valuable check on the Executive's power not to defend statutes.
143. Cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (arguing that congressional commandeering of
state executive officers to enforce federal law violated separation of powers principles because it rendered
Congress less dependent on the President).
144. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §3807 (2012) (on congressional oversight).
145. See GRODZINS, supra note 23, at 8.
146. Id
147. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY & TRAGIC COMPROMISE
16 (2008) (arguing that, under federalism, "there must be some types of decisions that are reserved to the sub-
sidiary governmental units and that the central government may not displace or countermand;" that is, "the sub-
sidiary units possess rights against the central government"); see also id. at 20-21 ("Decentralization, in con-
trast, is a managerial strategy by which a centralized regime can achieve the results it desires in a more
effective manner.... [T]he central government decides how decision-making authority will be divided between
itself and the geographical subunits."). Other scholars have offered similar definitions. See, e.g., RIKER, supra
note 5, at 11 (defining federalism as existing when the "autonomy of each government in its own sphere" is
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ly be difficult to change,14 8 but also that it must impose some meaningful constraint on
actions by the central government. A federalism theory that fails to impose such a con-
straint is not "federalism," but nationalism.
Not all contemporary federalism theories can pass this test. My colleague, Neil
Siegel, writing with Robert Cooter, has developed a sophisticated theory of "collective
action federalism" suggesting that Congress's Article I powers should be judged as ex-
tending to all cases where national action addresses collective action problems that make
state-level action difficult. 149 But because the test turns on essentially policy-based con-
siderations, Professors Siegel and Cooter advocate that courts largely defer to Congress
on whether such collective action problems actually justify any particular federal ac-
tion. 150 The result is a test that has little chance of meaningfully constraining national
power. Not entirely surprisingly, for Siegel and Cooter, their analysis turned out to be
extremely useful in supporting the Obama Administration's healthcare legislation,151 but
it is not evident that it would impose much of a limit on national initiatives.
Is uncooperative federalism likewise just another theorization of unlimited national
power? An uncooperative federalist might answer this worry in several different ways.
The first might emphasize that uncooperative federalism is an account of the power and
influence that state-level implementers of federal legislation have within our federal sys-
tem; it does not overtly purport to address how other aspects of our federalism, such as
the role of courts in enforcing limits on national power, should operate. In this, it is un-
like most contemporary accounts of the "political safeguards" of federalism, which gen-
erally argue that because aspects of the national political process effectively protect state
governmental interests, therefore the courts should not enforce constitutional limitations
on national power. 152 Although Professor Gerken has generally taken traditional nation-
alist positions rejecting strong judicial review of federalism questions, her theory of un-
cooperative federalism does not compel that view.153 One might well celebrate the abil-
protected by a constitutional "guarantee").
148. 1 have argued elsewhere that the degree of entrenchment in a federal system is necessarily more com-
plex and multi-layered than the binary entrenched/unentrenched dichotomy that Dean Rubin and Professor Fee-
ley posit. See Ernest A. Young, What Does it Take to Make a Federal System? On Constitutional Entrench-
ment, Separate Spheres, and Identity, 45 TULSA L. REv. 831, 837-39 (2011).
149. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory ofArticle 1, Section
8, 63 STAN. L. REv. 115 (2010).
150. Id. at 180.
151. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax
Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012); Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism
and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 29 (2012); Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitu-
tional Limits that the Minimum Coverage Provision Respects, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 591 (2011).
152. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 32, at 380; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). Herbert Wechsler's earlier articulation of the "po-
litical safeguards" theory did not take this position, arguing only that "the Court is on weakest ground when it
opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interests of the states, whose representa-
tives control the legislative process and, by hypothesis, have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged
Act of Congress." Wechsler, supra note 32, at 559. Professor Wechsler denied "that the Court can decline to
measure national enactments by the Constitution when it is called upon to face the question in the course of
ordinary litigation." Id.; see also Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 79, at 70-79 (discussing Wechsler's
theory).
153. As I have already discussed, Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken do argue that courts should reject
the anti-commandeering doctrine on the ground that commandeering will tend to force state officials into closer
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ity of state bureaucrats to conduct guerrilla warfare against federal mandates within the
structure of federal regulatory programs while still insisting that, say, the Commerce
Clause also limits the scope of those programs. (That would be my own position.)
A second possible answer would argue that, in practice, the administrative safe-
guards of federalism are more effective in preserving state autonomy than judicially-
enforced principles like the enumerated powers doctrine. That is certainly possible; I
have argued elsewhere that the Supreme Court's efforts to narrow the Commerce Clause,
for example, have not done much for state autonomy and are unlikely to ever go very
far. 154 But until some serious empirical work is done - and intractable problems like
how to measure state autonomy are overcome - it will be hard to know for sure.
In any event, uncooperative federalists need to confront serious doubts about the
intermixing of national and state authorities that cooperative federalism entails. Two par-
ticular challenges have been salient in the recent literature. The first arises from propo-
nents of what we might call "competitive," or perhaps even "libertarian" federalism. 155
In a powerful and closely argued recent book, my friend Michael Greve has argued that
rather than aggrandizing national authority, cooperative federalism in fact allows states
to behave as "cartels" that then use national authority to suppress competition among
state jurisdictions.156 The Clean Air Act, for example, releases states that prefer higher
levels of pollution regulation from the threat of economic competition from states that
would, absent the federal floor, opt for lower levels of regulation (and taxes to pay for
it). 157
In Professor Greve's account, cartel federalism is driven primarily by the break-
down of clear jurisdictional boundaries between national and state authority. 158 The old
regime of dual federalism, Greve argues, forced states to compete with respect to all the
regulatory matters within their sphere. 159 Once national regulatory authority came to
overlap with state authority, however, powerful states could band together to impose na-
tional standards that prevent competition.160 It is not clear, however, how the second key
aspect of modem cooperative federalism - the actual implementation of national law by
state officials which forms the predicate for Gerken and Bulman-Pozen's theory - con-
tributes to this problem. Returning to exclusive regulatory spheres, as Greve somewhat
wistfully suggests,161 would eliminate opportunities for uncooperative implementation
contact with federal ones, and this will enhance the opportunity of the former to play their uncooperative role.
See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 2, at 1259. But this (in my view, unpersuasive) point is hardly a core
implication of their theory.
154. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 79, at 135-141.
155. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism: Reconciling Collective Action Federalism and Lib-
ertarian Federalism in the Obamacare Litigation and Beyound, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 288, 289 (2012) (using the
term "libertarian federalism" to describe the view that "federalism exists for reasons other than efficiency of
regulation and particularly that the Founders created the federal structure for the protection of liberty [and that]
there is inherent value to state power that ought to be preserved against national encroachments").
156. MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DowN CONSTITUTION 7-8 (2012).
157. See id at 281-82.
158. Id. at 7-8.
159. Id at 66-68.
160. Id at 68-69.
161. Id at 84
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by state officials, but Greve acknowledges that there is really no going back to dual fed-
eralism.162 If that is true, then the uncooperative aspects of contemporary marble cake
federalism may provide a means of injecting some state-level competition back into
Greve's cartelized system. State officials might, in other words, use their agency slack to
tweak national policies in pro-competitive ways so as to get a leg up on other states. This
possibility bears further exploration by scholars concerned about the anti-competitive as-
pects of national standards.
A more direct critique of cooperative federalism arises from the literature on fiscal
federalism. A perennial problem in federal systems concerns the autonomy of state
spending and borrowing decisions. In most federal systems around the world, the central
government explicitly or implicitly guarantees the debts of its subnational units.163 The
risk in such a system, however, is that the subnational units will take advantage of this
arrangement by over-borrowing and over-spending, secure in the knowledge that the cen-
tral government will bail them out. 164 In order to solve this moral hazard problem, most
systems also give the central government a large degree of control over the subunits'
spending and borrowing decisions.165 Alexander Hamilton advocated such a regime for
the American states in the early Republic when he persuaded Congress to assume the
states' Revolutionary War debts and sought to impose broad national authority over their
finances. 166
Hamilton's call for national authority over state spending and borrowing was re-
jected, however, and since the assumption of the Revolutionary War debts, our federal-
ism has taken a quite different course. A second state debt crisis occurred in the 1840s,
and Congress rejected state pleas for a bailout.167 It has since maintained a credible "no
bailout" commitment, allowing multiple state debt defaults in the late nineteenth century
and another during the Depression, all largely without federal intervention. 168 In the ab-
sence of a central bailout, states find themselves subject to market discipline; their cost of
borrowing, for example, will reflect the market's perception of each particular state's fis-
cal probity rather than hopes of a national rescue. Hence, Jonathan Rodden's recent anal-
ysis of state bond yields, credit default swaps on state debt, and state credit ratings
demonstrates that financial markets continue to assess the creditworthiness of states indi-
vidually.169 By contrast, the German hinder - whose debts are guaranteed by the central
government - all have the same credit rating regardless of fiscal condition and spending
practices.170
162. Id. at 354.
163. Paul E. Peterson & Daniel Nadler, Freedom to Fail: The Keystone of American Federalism, 79 U. CHI.
L. REV. 251, 253 (2012).
164. Jonathan A. Rodden, Market Discipline and US. Federalism, in WHEN STATES Go BROKE: THE
ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIs 123, 124 (Peter Conti-
Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012).
165. Peterson & Nadler, supra note 163, at 253-54.
166. Rodden, supra note 164, at 124.
167. JONATHAN A. RODDEN, HAMILTON'S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 57-
64 (2006).
168. Peterson & Nadler, supra note 163, at 264-65.
169. Rodden, supra note 164, at 137-40.
170. RODDEN, supra note 167, at 160-62.
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The point is that either of these arrangements - central bailouts paired with con-
trols on decentralized borrowing and spending, or no controls paired with a credible "no
bailout" commitment - can work, but blurring them is dangerous. As Michael Greve
has observed, "[t]he fundamental fiscal federalism dilemma is between a credible central
commitment against bailouts and central control over subordinate governments' fiscal
affairs."1 71 And cooperative federalism models do blur these two alternatives by merging
governmental responsibilities between the state and national levels. When states spend
large proportions of their resources implementing national laws, it is hard not to see the
national government as at least partly to blame for high levels of state expenditures. And
when national authorities depend on state officials to implement national policy, it is
hard to believe that Congress would not intervene in a state fiscal crisis that threatened
state administrative capacities.172
Hence the problem for uncooperative federalism: notwithstanding the advantages
that such a model affords for state autonomy, it also relies on a set of institutional ar-
rangements that threaten the structure of state fiscal sovereignty and accountability. The
national government has already engaged in a variety of "soft bailouts" in connection
with the present recession, 173 and although the capital markets appear to still regard its
basic "no bailout" commitment as credible, that situation will not continue indefinitely as
state and national governments grow even more financially interdependent. This is not,
of course, necessarily a bad thing. One could see the erosion of the commitment against
bailouts as a necessary predicate to a sounder, more Hamiltonian scheme of fiscal feder-
alism. But a central government that guarantees state debt will be forced to exert control
over state finances or risk ruin, and it is far from clear that the decrease in state autonomy
arising from that development would not swamp the advantages to states stemming from
uncooperative federalism.
At the end of the day, I do not mean to argue that a model emphasizing the admin-
istrative safeguards of state autonomy is "fruitcake federalism." As throughout this essay,
my goal is primarily to identify areas for further exploration. Scholars should investigate,
for instance, whether cooperative federalism arrangements can be designed to strengthen
opportunities for state competition and to maintain the fiscal separation and transparency
that underpin our system of fiscal federalism. Now that Professors Gerken and Bulman-
Pozen have identified the advantages of state administration of federal law, however,
those advantages need to be assessed with a clear-eyed view to the downsides of such
arrangements as well.
CONCLUSION
One of the principal virtues of a federal system is that it helps people of differing
views live together and cooperate on certain projects but agree to disagree on others. I
am not surprised by Professor Gerken's turn to federalism as a primary field of inquiry
171. Michael S. Greve, Our Federalism is not Europe's. It's Becoming Argentina's, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL. 17, 39 (2012).
172. Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL. 117, 147-48 (2012).
173. Id. at 137-38.
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because federalism speaks to one of her own virtues, which is not simply to respect but to
befriend persons with differing views, even in the face of disagreement on basic political
issues. It is not clear that she and I agree on any matters of substance other than that Da-
vid Souter is the greatest Supreme Court Justice and Buffy the Vampire Slayer is the
greatest TV show. But I am proud to say that we have been the closest of friends for al-
most twenty years, and our political differences have never mattered a bit. 17 4
On a national scale, this is one of the most important things that federalism does: it
allows people of differing views to bracket many of their disagreements in order to live
together in a national community predicated on values that do enjoy a broader consensus.
This is not federalism's only virtue, but it is an important one - and one that plays a
central role in Professor Gerken's scholarship. This conflict-mitigating virtue is worth
attending to in a time of considerable division and rancor in our national politics. Tolerat-
ing a certain degree of state-by-state divergence on issues of the day may help lower the
stakes on some of the issues that divide us. While Gerken celebrates the role of disa-
greement and bureaucratic infighting in our federal system, at the end of the day her vi-
sion of federalism is anything but uncooperative.
174. Which is not to say that differences of opinion on other issues, such as the appropriate level of chitchat
in a shared office in chambers, have not caused a certain degree of friction.
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